Halevy (2008) states the equivalence between diminishing impatience (i.e., quasi-hyperbolic discounting) and the common ratio effect. The present paper shows that one way of the equivalence is false and shows the correct and general relationships: diminishing impatience is equivalent to the certainty effect and that strong diminishing impatience (i.e., hyperbolic discounting) is equivalent to the common ratio effect.
quasi-hyperbolic discounting in terms of diminishing impatience:
(1) ∀t ∈ Z + , t ≥ 1 :
where D(·) is a discount function. Also, he characterizes hyperbolic discounting in terms of strong diminishing impatience:
(2) ∀t ∈ Z + :
D(t) D(t + 1) > D(t + 1) D(t + 2) .
He studies a decision maker for whom
where β is a pure time-discount factor, g is a rank-dependent probability-weighting function, and r is a constant hazard probability per period. Theorem 1 in Halevy (2008) is equivalent to the statement that D exhibits diminishing impatience if and only if the elasticity
of g is increasing. Claim 1 shows that the "only if" part of this theorem is false (although it should be noted that this error essentially originates in Uzi Segal (1987a, Lemma 4.1), on which the "only if" part of Theorem 1 in Halevy (2008) crucially depends).
Then D (t) exhibits diminishing impatience while g has decreasing elasticity in a neighborhood of p = 0.
PROOF:
First, we will show that D exhibits diminishing impatience. As Halevy (2008 Halevy ( , p.1150 shows in Theorem 1, diminishing impatience is equivalent to g (pq) > g (p) g (q) for all p, q ∈ (0, 1). That this inequality holds for g defined by (4) follows from the following straightforward calculation. Simple algebra yields that this inequality holds if and only if for all p, q ∈ (0, 1),
which is true because 2
Next, we will show g has decreasing elasticity in a neighborhood of p = 0. This is also by direct calculation. With some manipulation, the derivative
which, one can immediately see, is continuous and converges to −∞ as p → 0. Therefore, ε
is negative in a neighborhood of zero. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Given Claim 1, Claim 2 shows that diminishing impatience does not imply the CRE. To provide Claim 2, we review the definition of the CRE. Denote by (x, l), a lottery which gives a positive prize x ∈ R + with probability l ∈ [0, 1] and gives 0 with the rest of probability 1 − l. The common ratio effect (CRE) is defined by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979 p.282) as follows: for all x, y ∈ R + and p, q ∈ (0, 1), l ∈ (0, 1], if (y, ql) is indifferent to (x, l), then (y, pql) is preferred to (x, pl).
The certainty effect (CE) is defined as a special case of the CRE when l = 1.
CLAIM 2: Rank-dependent risk preferences determined by g defined by (4) together with a continuous and strictly increasing utility function u satisfying u(0) = 0 do not exhibit the common ratio effect (CRE).
This would follow from Claim 1 and Halevy's (2008) claim that Segal (1987b) proves that increasing elasticity holds if and only if the CRE holds. However, Segal (1987b) only proves that increasing elasticity implies the CRE. We show the converse here. Since we showed that the elasticity is decreasing in a neighborhood of 0, there exist p
) dp
This is true for any p in the region where the elasticity is decreasing. Hence, by the continuity of g, there exist p ′ and q ′ in the region where the elasticity is decreasing such that p ′ < q ′ , αq ′ < 1, and g(αp
Since u is strictly increasing and u(0) = 0, lim x→0 u(x)/u(y) = 0 < g(αp ′ )/g(αq ′ ) < 1 = u(y)/u(y) for all y > 0. Therefore, by the continuity of u, there exist prizes x and y such that
This implies that g(αq
Since α > 1, this violates the CRE and completes the proof of Claim 2.
Claims 1 and 2 imply that only a partial result of Halevy (2008) is true in general: The CRE implies diminishing impatience. Claim 3 shows the complete relationships as follows:
CLAIM 3: Suppose that D is defined by (3). (i) Diminishing impatience is equivalent to the certainty effect (CE), (ii) Strong diminishing impatience is equivalent to the common ratio effect (CRE).

PROOF:
For the rank-dependent utility maximizer, the CE is as follows: for all outcomes x, y and p, q
Diminishing Impatience ⇔ ∀t ∈ Z + , ∀r ∈ (0, 1)
where the first and the second equivalences are by Theorem 1 of Halevy (2008 Halevy ( , p.1150 . Similarly, the CRE is as follows: for all outcomes x, y and p, q ∈ (0, 1),
This completes the proof of Claim 3.
There are assumptions, such as monotonicity of ε g (p) or convexity of g, under which the "only if" part of Theorem 1 in Halevy (2008) is true, so that diminishing impatience becomes equivalent to the CRE. As noted earlier, Claim 3 shows that any such assumption must confound the distinction between quasi-hyperbolic discounting and hyperbolic discounting, and also between the CRE and the CE.
Claim 3 is a special case of the results in Kota Saito (2009) which shows these relationships without assuming specific form of utility function and hazard probability function.
